The conflict in Sudan, entering its third year of active warfare between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), represents a total breakdown of state-monopolized violence. While media narratives focus on "catastrophe," a structural analysis reveals that the current stalemate is a function of balanced asymmetric capabilities and the monetization of humanitarian failure. This is not a "forgotten war" in the sense of public memory, but a calculated attrition where both belligerents find the cost of peace higher than the cost of localized, low-intensity territorial competition.
The Bilateral Attrition Framework
The war persists because neither the SAF nor the RSF possesses the specific capability required to achieve total kinetic dominance. Their military structures create a strategic deadlock defined by two opposing operational philosophies: Don't miss our previous article on this related article.
- Fixed-Wing and Heavy Artillery Dominance (SAF): The SAF maintains control over the air and heavy ordnance. This allows them to deny the RSF the ability to govern large, concentrated urban centers effectively but does not provide the "boots on the ground" density required to clear and hold territory in decentralized environments like Darfur or the vast residential blocks of Omdurman.
- Highly Mobile Light Infantry (RSF): The RSF utilizes a "technicals" based doctrine—fast-moving, unarmored vehicles with high-caliber weaponry. This provides tactical agility and the ability to embed within civilian infrastructure, effectively turning metropolitan areas into a series of disconnected insurgencies.
This creates a Tactical Equilibrium. The SAF can destroy RSF concentrations from the air, but the RSF can reconstitute in the time it takes for SAF infantry to mobilize. Consequently, the frontline does not shift; it merely pulses.
The Weaponization of Food and Logistics
The humanitarian crisis is not a byproduct of the war; it is a primary lever of the war's economy. When 25 million people face acute hunger, the control of "access" becomes a sovereign asset. We must categorize this via the Three Pillars of Logistical Blockade: To read more about the history here, NBC News offers an in-depth summary.
- Bureaucratic Obstruction: By centralizing aid permits in Port Sudan, the SAF exercises de facto veto power over which regions receive caloric intake. This forces international NGOs to negotiate with a state entity that has a vested interest in starving RSF-held territories.
- Physical Interdiction: The RSF controls key transit corridors in the interior. They utilize these checkpoints not just for revenue generation through "taxation" of aid convoys, but as a method of population control. If a civilian population is dependent on RSF-sanctioned food trucks, their loyalty or at least their compliance is secured.
- Market Destruction: The systematic looting of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan and the destruction of the Gezira Scheme—once the world's largest irrigation project—has shifted Sudan from a regional breadbasket to a total import-dependent entity. This transition removes the possibility of civilian self-sufficiency, ensuring the population remains tethered to the warring factions for survival.
The Microeconomics of Displacement
Internal displacement in Sudan has surpassed 10 million people, creating the largest displacement crisis globally. From a strategy perspective, this movement of people functions as a Demographic Pressure Release.
When a population is displaced, the belligerent in control of the abandoned territory experiences a reduction in "governance overhead." They no longer need to manage civil services or risk popular uprisings in occupied zones. Meanwhile, the recipient zones (often border regions or neighboring countries like Chad and South Sudan) face severe economic shocks. This exports the instability of the Sudanese conflict to the surrounding Horn of Africa and Sahel, forcing international actors to prioritize regional containment over internal resolution.
The cost function of this displacement is borne entirely by external donors. For the SAF and RSF, a displaced population is a neutral outcome. For the international community, it is an exponential increase in long-term liabilities.
The Failure of the "Unified State" Hypothesis
International diplomatic efforts, such as the Jeddah process, have largely failed because they operate on the flawed assumption that Sudan can return to a unified, centralized military-civilian government. This ignores the Institutional Fragmentation that has occurred since April 2023.
Sudan currently operates as a "Dual State." The SAF maintains the "Legacy State" in the East, controlling the central bank, the diplomatic corps, and the ports. The RSF maintains a "Shadow State" in the West and parts of the capital, controlling gold mines, illicit trade routes, and local tribal alliances.
Neither side can afford a peace treaty that requires the integration of their forces. The RSF knows that integration into a SAF-led military means the eventual purging of their leadership. The SAF knows that recognizing the RSF as a permanent political entity means the end of the military’s decades-long monopoly on the national economy.
Gold and the External Liquidity Loop
The conflict is self-funding, which removes the traditional "exhaustion" barrier found in civil wars. Sudan is Africa's third-largest gold producer. The RSF's control over the Jebel Amer mines and other sites in Darfur provides them with direct access to hard currency, bypassing international banking sanctions.
This creates an External Liquidity Loop:
- Gold is extracted from RSF-held mines.
- The gold is smuggled through regional hubs, primarily the UAE.
- The proceeds are used to purchase small arms, fuel, and mercenary services via networks in Libya and the Central African Republic.
- The SAF counters this by leveraging state-to-state relationships, trading maritime access or agricultural concessions for sophisticated drone technology and intelligence.
As long as the price of gold remains high and the logistics of smuggling remain open, the RSF has no financial incentive to stop fighting. Similarly, as long as the SAF can leverage its status as the "official" government to secure bilateral defense pacts, they remain viable.
The Broken Metrics of Intervention
Current humanitarian metrics focus on "Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)" levels. While essential for aid allocation, these metrics are broken because they do not account for Black Market Volatility. In Khartoum, the price of basic staples is not dictated by global supply but by the number of checkpoints between the port and the market.
Traditional mediation fails because it treats the conflict as a political disagreement. In reality, it is a Market Competition for Sovereign Assets. The "humanitarian catastrophe" is the friction generated by this competition.
Regional Contagion and the Horn of Africa Pivot
The conflict is currently undergoing a "Geopolitical Widening." Because Sudan sits at the intersection of the Red Sea and the Sahel, the war is attracting secondary players seeking to secure maritime interests or prevent the spread of Islamist militancy.
The Red Sea corridor is the primary vulnerability for the SAF. If the RSF or their proxies gain a foothold on the coast, the SAF's last remaining advantage—international recognition and supply—evaporates. Conversely, the SAF is attempting to mobilize "popular resistance" committees, essentially arming civilians. This creates a high risk of Social Atomization, where even if the two main generals reach an agreement, the thousands of newly armed civilians and local militias will refuse to demobilize.
Strategic Forecast: The Partition Path
The current trajectory points not toward a victory or a peace deal, but toward Permanent Fragmentation.
Sudan is likely to follow the "Libyan Model"—a country split between two rival administrations with fluctuating frontlines and a permanent foreign presence. The SAF will likely solidify a base in Port Sudan, operating as a rump state with international recognition but limited internal reach. The RSF will likely consolidate a "Dar-State" in the west, operating as a paramilitary-commercial entity.
The strategic play for international stakeholders must shift from "Rebuilding Sudan" to "Mitigating Regional Collapse." This requires:
- Decentralized Aid Distribution: Moving away from the Port Sudan bottleneck by establishing cross-border aid corridors from Chad and South Sudan, regardless of SAF "sovereign" objections.
- Gold Supply Chain Interdiction: Aggressively sanctioning the refineries and buyers in third-party countries that provide the RSF with the liquidity to sustain their operations.
- Local Governance Support: Directly funding and protecting the "Emergency Response Rooms" (ERRs)—grassroots civilian networks that have proven more efficient at aid delivery than large-scale international organizations.
The conflict will not end through a signed document in a foreign capital. It will end when the cost of maintaining the "Dual State" exceeds the revenue generated by its destruction. Until then, the "catastrophe" remains a stable, if horrific, economic equilibrium.
