Why Political Obituaries Keep Getting Written Too Early for Lula and Netanyahu

Why Political Obituaries Keep Getting Written Too Early for Lula and Netanyahu

Modern political commentary has a terminal addiction to premature funerals. Every few months, pundits, opposition strategists, and foreign desks declare the careers of Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu effectively over. Yet both men continue to occupy the highest offices in their respective nations, defying corruption convictions, mass street protests, devastating security failures, and plummeting approval ratings. According to political analysts who track executive durability across fractured democracies, their survival is not a fluke of charisma or sheer luck. It is the result of deliberate structural mastery, deep institutional memory, and an ability to turn existential crises into political oxygen.

The conventional wisdom in newsrooms tends to treat political capital like a non-renewable resource. Once a leader suffers a catastrophic scandal or a historic policy failure, the assumption goes, the ledger hits zero and resignation or electoral defeat inevitably follows. Lula and Netanyahu operate under an entirely different set of rules. They understand that in polarized, multi-party democracies, you do not need to be universally loved to govern. You only need to remain indispensable to your core coalition while ensuring the opposition remains too fragmented to offer a coherent alternative. You might also find this related article interesting: Why Indian Navy Port Calls in Italy Are Actually a Quiet Logistics Trap.

The Architecture of Indispensability

To understand how two leaders from radically different ideological traditions perfected the art of political survival, you have to look past their rhetoric and examine the machinery of their coalitions. Both men spent decades building patronage networks, party apparatuses, and personal brands that fused their own identities with the survival of their political movements.

In Brazil, Lula did not merely lead the Workers’ Party (PT); he became its gravitational center. Even during his 580 days in a Curitiba prison cell following the Operation Car Wash corruption investigation, no viable successor emerged from within the ranks of the Brazilian left. Party elders and rank-and-file voters alike treated his absence as an interregnum rather than an end. When the Supreme Federal Court annulled his convictions on procedural grounds in 2021, Lula did not have to rebuild a political machine from scratch. He simply stepped back into the driver's seat of a vehicle that had been idling in neutral, waiting for him to return. As highlighted in detailed coverage by TIME, the results are significant.

Netanyahu achieved a similar lock on the Israeli right, though through far more ruthless internal pruning. Over nearly three decades at the helm of the Likud party, Netanyahu systematically sidelined potential rivals—figures like Gideon Sa'ar, Naftali Bennett, and Avigdor Lieberman—forcing them either into political exile or into splinter parties on the fringes. By the time his corruption trials began and the unprecedented intelligence and security failures of October 7, 2023, unfolded, Likud lacked an internal mechanism to replace him without triggering its own collapse.

Political scientists refer to this dynamic as organizational capture. When a leader successfully makes the cost of their removal higher than the cost of their retention for their own allies, traditional accountability mechanisms break down. Backbenchers who might privately despise the leader’s baggage still calculate that jumping ship means political suicide.

Turning Institutional Crises into Campaign Fuel

Most politicians try to survive scandals by lowering their profile, apologizing, and waiting for the news cycle to move on. Lula and Netanyahu do the exact opposite. They weaponize the very institutions attempting to hold them accountable, reframing legal and administrative battles as existential struggles between the will of the people and an unaccountable elite.

Consider how both men handled their respective judicial reckonings. During Operation Car Wash, Lula and his legal team aggressively targeted the impartiality of Judge Sergio Moro and the federal prosecutors in Curitiba. Years before leaked messages revealed improper coordination between the judge and the prosecution, Lula’s camp argued that the legal process was an act of "lawfare" designed to prevent him from running in the 2018 presidential election. What began as a defensive legal strategy evolved into a potent political narrative that resonated deeply with millions of working-class Brazilians who remembered the economic boom of Lula's first two terms.

Netanyahu executed a remarkably parallel playbook when indicted on charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust in 2019. Rather than stepping aside to clear his name, as his predecessor Ehud Olmert had done a decade earlier, Netanyahu remained in office and launched a sustained offensive against the Israeli judiciary, the attorney general's office, and the police. He framed his prosecution as an attempted coup by a left-wing "deep state" determined to overturn the ballot box.

This tactic works because it shifts the voter's focus away from the specific allegations of misconduct and onto a broader cultural grievance. Once the debate becomes about whether the courts or the media are biased against a particular demographic, the factual details of a graft investigation or a security lapse lose their political bite. Supporters stop asking whether their leader is innocent and start asking whose side they are on.

The Power of the Fragmented Opposition

A leader’s longevity depends just as much on the dysfunction of their enemies as on their own tactical brilliance. Both Brazil and Israel feature electoral systems that encourage party proliferation, making it extraordinarily difficult for oppositions to unite behind a single message or candidate.

In Israel, the proportional representation system with a low electoral threshold has produced a Knesset divided into a dozen or more factions. Between 2019 and 2022, Netanyahu’s opponents managed to force five elections in under four years, eventually assembling an ideologically incoherent "change coalition" that stretched from right-wing nationalists to an independent Arab Islamist party. That government lasted barely a year. Its collapse proved Netanyahu’s core argument to Israeli voters: whatever his flaws, he was the only figure capable of assembling a stable, ideologically aligned governing bloc.

Lula faced a different version of the same structural advantage during his 2022 comeback against Jair Bolsonaro. Lula did not win because the Brazilian electorate suddenly embraced every plank of the Workers’ Party platform. He won by less than two percentage points because he positioned himself as the sole viable shield against Bolsonaro’s brand of right-wing populism. Centrist figures like Geraldo Alckmin—Lula’s bitter rival in the 2006 presidential race—swallowed their pride and joined his ticket as vice president. Once back in the Planalto Palace, Lula immediately began governing through the Centrão, the ideological-agnostic bloc of congressional power brokers who trade legislative votes for cabinet ministries and budget allocations.

Critics argue that this reliance on transactional politics erodes democratic norms and stalls structural reform. In Brazil, feeding the Centrão has forced Lula to water down environmental and fiscal commitments, frustrating his progressive base while failing to fully pacify financial markets. In Israel, Netanyahu’s dependence on ultra-Orthodox and far-right religious nationalist parties has handed immense leverage to fringe ministers, complicating Israel’s diplomatic standing and deepening domestic fractures over military conscription and judicial power.

Why Conventional Polling Misreads Their Staying Power

If you rely strictly on standard approval ratings, both leaders look perpetually doomed. Lula’s net favorability has repeatedly dipped into negative territory amid inflation concerns, fiscal squabbles with Brazil’s central bank, and unpopular foreign policy pronouncements. Netanyahu’s polling numbers cratered after October 7, with vast majorities of Israelis telling pollsters they wanted him to resign once the immediate military crisis subsided.

Yet polls measure sentiment at a fixed moment in time, whereas survival in office is determined by institutional friction. Removing a sitting head of government between elections requires specific constitutional triggers—impeachment in a presidential system like Brazil, or a constructive vote of no confidence in a parliamentary system like Israel.

In Brazil, impeaching a president requires a two-thirds supermajority in both chambers of Congress, alongside the explicit cooperation of the Speaker of the Lower House, who holds unilateral authority to open proceedings. As long as Lula keeps federal funds flowing to congressional districts and avoids an outright economic collapse, the Speaker has zero incentive to pull that trigger.

In Israel, toppling a prime minister requires 61 members of the 120-seat Knesset to vote simultaneously to dissolve the government and call new elections. For Netanyahu’s coalition partners, voting to bring down the government means surrendering ministerial budgets, legislative priorities, and guaranteed seats at the cabinet table in exchange for the uncertainty of a snap election where polls suggest many of them would lose power.

The math is brutal and simple. Pundits look at public anger and predict an imminent collapse; politicians look at the parliamentary arithmetic and decide to stay put.

The Myth of the Clean Exit

There is a darker, often overlooked reason why leaders like Lula and Netanyahu fight so ferociously to remain in power long after most politicians would retire to write memoirs and give paid speeches. For both men, leaving office carries existential personal risk.

At nearly 80 years old, Lula knows that his current term represents his final chapter to cement his historical legacy and protect the Workers’ Party from another decade in the wilderness. Stepping down early or presiding over a failed presidency would validate the narrative of his critics—that the economic successes of the 2000s were merely the byproduct of a global commodities boom rather than sound governance, and that the corruption scandals of the 2010s were systemic rather than anomalous.

For Netanyahu, the stakes are even more immediate. His ongoing corruption trial in the Jerusalem District Court moves slowly, slowed further by wartime delays and legal motions, but it has not disappeared. Remaining prime minister gives him immense procedural leverage, a global platform, and the political shield of high office. Out of power, he becomes a private citizen facing the full weight of the Israeli criminal justice system without the institutional buffer of the premiership.

Veterans of political reporting recognize this pattern immediately. When a leader’s personal freedom, historical vindication, or familial legacy is tied directly to holding executive authority, they stop playing by standard electoral incentives. They are willing to absorb levels of public hostility, international diplomatic isolation, and coalition blackmail that would drive a conventional politician to resign within a week.

What Analysts Miss About Generational Politics

Observers frequently assume that time itself will eventually do what opposition parties cannot. Both Lula and Netanyahu belong to a political generation forged in the late twentieth century—a period defined by intense ideological binaries, top-down party discipline, and analog media ecosystems. Surely, the argument goes, younger voters raised on social media and impatient with decades-old grievances will eventually sweep them aside.

That assumption ignores how effectively both men have adapted their communications strategies to modern media fragmentation. Neither leader relies on traditional press conferences or mainstream editorial boards to reach their base.

Netanyahu has spent years cultivating an alternative right-wing media ecosystem in Israel, bypassing legacy television networks in favor of sympathetic outlets like Channel 14, direct-to-camera social media broadcasts, and aggressive digital targeting. He understands that in an attention economy, dominating the daily news cycle—even through outrage—keeps him at the center of the national conversation and starves rivals of oxygen.

Lula, despite his age, maintains an unmatched ability to communicate in visceral, emotional terms that cut through algorithmic noise. His team pairs traditional grassroots organizing through labor unions and social movements with slick digital campaigns tailored to WhatsApp groups and TikTok feeds, contrasting tangible bread-and-butter social programs like Bolsa Família against the abstract macroeconomic criticisms of financial analysts.

Meanwhile, the younger generation of politicians waiting in the wings in both countries often struggles to match their stature. In Brazil, the left has failed to cultivate a national figure with Lula’s cross-regional appeal, while the right remains heavily dependent on the Bolsonaro family brand. In Israel, centrist leaders like Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid have repeatedly seen their polling surges evaporate when forced to make hard strategic choices rather than simply campaigning as the "anti-Bibi" alternative.

The Limits of the Survival Playbook

None of this means Lula and Netanyahu are invulnerable. The very tactics that keep them in power carry severe long-term costs that steadily narrow their room for maneuver.

Governing through permanent crisis creates institutional exhaustion. In Brazil, constant friction between the executive branch, Congress, and the central bank injects chronic uncertainty into the economy, driving up borrowing costs and limiting the government's ability to fund the very social programs that sustain Lula’s popularity. Every compromise made to appease the Centrão dilutes the ideological coherence of his administration, risking voter apathy among the core progressive constituency that turned out to save him in 2022.

In Israel, Netanyahu’s reliance on tactical survival has strained relationships with key international allies, particularly Washington, while pushing domestic social cohesion to the breaking point. When every strategic decision—from hostage negotiations to military deployments—is viewed by half the country through the prism of the prime minister's personal political survival, public trust in state institutions erodes to dangerous levels.

The fundamental flaw in the survivor's playbook is that tactical agility cannot substitute for strategic resolution. You can delay a reckoning for years by outmaneuvering coalition partners, attacking the courts, and exploiting opposition divisions. You cannot indefinitely postpone the underlying economic, demographic, or security realities that created the crisis in the first place.

Eventually, the bill comes due—not when a columnist decides the story is over, and not when an opposition rally fills a city square, but at the exact moment the power brokers inside the leader's own tent decide that keeping them in office is finally more dangerous than letting them fall.

BM

Bella Miller

Bella Miller has built a reputation for clear, engaging writing that transforms complex subjects into stories readers can connect with and understand.