Inside the Pakistan Gas Crisis Nobody Is Explaining Properly

Inside the Pakistan Gas Crisis Nobody Is Explaining Properly

Pakistan is caught in a bizarre energy trap where liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships sit idle or face diversion while domestic consumers pay punishing prices for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and the energy sector’s circular debt continues to balloon. This contradiction stems from rigid long-term import contracts, collapsing industrial demand, a broken cross-subsidy pricing model, and severe distribution bottlenecks. Rather than suffering from a simple supply shortage, the country is drowning in a structural mismatch between expensive imported fuel it cannot afford to burn and cheap domestic reserves that are rapidly running dry.

Walk through any industrial estate in Faisalabad or Karachi today, and the quiet is deafening. Factory owners who spent the last decade retooling their plants to run on natural gas have either shut down shifts or switched back to biomass and grid electricity. Meanwhile, in residential neighborhoods across Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, households brace for winter mornings with no gas pressure at the stove, forcing families to buy overpriced LPG cylinders from unregulated local dealers.

At the exact same time, state-owned energy importers are scrambling to manage surplus LNG cargoes. It sounds like an economic hallucination. How does a nation simultaneously suffer from a crippling fuel shortage and an unmanageable surplus of the very same fuel?

The Anatomy of a Structural Mismatch

To understand Pakistan's gas mess, you have to separate three distinct fuels that public commentary routinely lumps together: indigenous pipeline gas, imported LNG, and bottled LPG. They do not share the same pricing tiers, supply chains, or regulatory protections.

For decades, Pakistan ran on cheap, locally produced natural gas from massive fields like Sui in Balochistan. Successive governments treated this finite resource as an infinite political patronage tool. They expanded residential pipeline networks aggressively, subsidized household tariffs to absurdly low levels, and encouraged the transport sector to convert millions of vehicles to compressed natural gas (CNG).

That party ended years ago. Indigenous gas reserves have been depleting at a steady clip of roughly 7 to 9 percent annually, with no major new discoveries offsetting the decline.

To plug the widening gap, Islamabad turned to global markets in the mid-2010s, signing long-term, take-or-pay LNG contracts primarily with Qatar. Under a take-or-pay agreement, the buyer is legally obligated to pay for a contracted volume of fuel whether they actually take delivery of it or not. When global energy markets were calm and domestic industry was humming, this arrangement looked workable.

Then came the shockwaves. Global LNG prices spiked following geopolitical disruptions in Europe, currency devaluation hammered the Pakistani rupee, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded an end to unfunded energy subsidies. Suddenly, the cost of imported regasified liquefied natural gas (RLNG) became toxic for the local economy.

Why Imported LNG Is Piling Up

When fuel becomes too expensive for the people meant to buy it, the supply chain backs up like a clogged drain. That is precisely what is happening at Pakistan’s floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) at Port Qasim.

Historically, Pakistan’s power sector was supposed to be the anchor customer for imported LNG. Modern combined-cycle power plants in Punjab were built specifically to burn RLNG. However, electricity demand in Pakistan has slumped dramatically. High grid tariffs, combined with a massive, unregulated boom in rooftop solar installations among affluent households and factories, have crushed daytime grid consumption.

Because the power sector is drawing far less electricity than projected, state-run power plants are not burning their allocated LNG.

Industrial buyers—textile mills, fertilizer plants, and export manufacturers—were the second pillar of LNG demand. Yet as the government hiked gas tariffs to satisfy IMF conditions and curb fiscal deficits, Pakistani industrial gas prices surged past regional competitors in Bangladesh, India, and Vietnam. Many exporters simply priced themselves out of global markets, slashing production and canceling gas off-take.

This leaves state-owned entities like Pakistan State Oil (PSO) and Pakistan LNG Limited (PLL) holding rigid import schedules with nowhere to put the gas. Because pipeline networks have strict pressure limits, you cannot simply keep pumping gas into the national grid if nobody at the other end is burning it. Excess line-pack pressure threatens the physical integrity of the pipelines themselves.

Consequently, officials have been forced into desperate maneuvers:

  • Deferring cargoes at significant financial penalties or complicated scheduling trade-offs with suppliers.
  • Diverting gas into the residential network during peak winter months, a move that instantly bleeds cash because residential tariffs sit well below the actual import cost.
  • Shutting down domestic gas wells temporarily to make room in the pipes for imported LNG—a bizarre operational inversion where cheap local fuel is left in the ground so expensive foreign fuel doesn't breach contractual obligations.

The LPG Price Squeeze on Ordinary Households

While high-end LNG backs up at the ports, the average Pakistani household is getting crushed at the bottom of the energy pyramid.

When pipeline gas pressure drops to zero—which happens routinely during winter cooking hours—families cannot tap into the surplus LNG sitting at the terminals. Most residential areas lack the pricing mechanisms to absorb RLNG, and the state utilities, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) and Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC), ration residential supply to prevent financial hemorrhage.

That pushes millions of families directly into the LPG market. Unlike piped natural gas, which is heavily regulated and historically subsidized, LPG is largely market-driven and heavily reliant on private sector imports, mostly arriving overland from Iran or via sea cargoes.

Here is where the secondary crisis ignites. Whenever piped gas disappears, demand for LPG cylinders explodes overnight. Local production from domestic refineries covers only a fraction of national demand, leaving the market exposed to global price swings, rupee depreciation, and rampant hoarding by middlemen.

Even though the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) issues official monthly notification prices for LPG cylinders, those numbers exist largely on paper. In reality, a massive gray market operates across urban slums and rural towns alike. Distributors routinely tack on arbitrary premiums, decant gas illegally into substandard cylinders, and exploit winter scarcity. For a working-class family in Lahore or Rawalpindi, buying a single 11.8-kilogram domestic cylinder can easily eat up a quarter of a monthly minimum wage.

The Circular Debt Monster Nobody Can Tame

Behind the physical chaos of idle ships and empty stoves sits a financial black hole: gas sector circular debt.

For years, analysts obsessed over circular debt in the electricity sector, treating the gas sector’s financial troubles as a secondary nuisance. That was a massive miscalculation. The gas circular debt has swelled into trillions of rupees, rivaling the power sector crisis in both scale and systemic danger.

The mechanics of this debt are painfully straightforward, even if the political will to fix them is nonexistent.

First, there is the unfunded subsidy gap. For years, the government forced SNGPL and SSGC to sell expensive imported LNG to domestic consumers during winter while charging them a fraction of the cost, promising to reimburse the utilities later through budget subsidies. Those reimbursements rarely arrived on time, or in full.

Second, there is Unaccounted-for Gas (UFG)—industry shorthand for theft, pipeline leaks, and metering errors. In certain regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, UFG losses exceed 30 to 40 percent of the gas pumped into the network. Imagine a retail business losing a third of its inventory before it ever reaches the cash register, and you grasp the scale of the operational rot.

Third, there is judicial and political paralysis. Whenever OGRA approves a tariff hike to recover actual costs, industrial associations or consumer groups rush to the courts, securing stay orders that freeze collections for months or years. Meanwhile, unpaid receivables pile up on the balance sheets of upstream exploration companies like Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL).

Because OGDCL and PPL are not getting paid by the gas utilities, they lack the liquid cash flow to invest in aggressive new drilling and exploration. That starves the country of future domestic production, locking Pakistan into permanent reliance on expensive imports. It is a self-reinforcing doom loop.

What the Mainstream Coverage Misses

Most financial reporting frames Pakistan's energy crisis around IMF bailout conditions and balance-of-payments stress. Those macro pressures are real, but they obscure three deeper, structural failures that will persist even if global gas prices drop tomorrow.

The Rooftop Solar Cannibalization Effect

Pakistan is experiencing one of the fastest, most decentralized solar transitions in the developing world. Driven by punitive grid electricity tariffs, businesses and homeowners have imported gigawatts of cheap Chinese solar panels over the past two years.

While this is a triumph for individual survival, it has wrecked the economics of centralized energy planning. Every megawatt generated on a factory roof in Sialkot is a megawatt not bought from the national grid. That directly reduces the dispatch of RLNG-fired power plants, leaving the state stuck with surplus LNG contracts negotiated back when planners assumed grid electricity demand would grow at 6 percent forever. The energy transition is happening faster than the state’s rigid import contracts can adapt.

The Fertilizer Distortion

A massive chunk of Pakistan’s remaining cheap indigenous gas is funneled directly to fertilizer manufacturers at heavily discounted rates, justified under the banner of food security.

In theory, cheap gas produces cheap urea for farmers. In practice, the dual-pricing system—where some plants get dirt-cheap legacy gas while others pay higher rates—creates massive market distortions, encourages smuggling across borders, and deprives the national grid of domestic gas that could otherwise blend down the cost of imported LNG for export industries.

The Death of the Cross-Subsidy Model

For fifty years, Pakistan balanced its energy books through cross-subsidization: overcharging commercial and industrial users so residential voters could enjoy cheap utility bills.

That model is officially dead. Industrial consumers have hit a breaking point. When you push industrial tariffs past a certain threshold, factories do not quietly pay the bill—they shut down, shift to off-grid solar, or burn agricultural waste. Once your paying customers walk away, you are left with a network full of subsidized residential consumers and no revenue stream left to fund the subsidy.

The Brutal Arithmetic of Reform

Fixing this mess requires choices that no Pakistani government—civilian or military-backed—has ever been willing to stomach all at once.

You cannot solve a supply-demand mismatch with administrative price caps or temporary cargo deferrals. As long as domestic gas is sold below its replacement cost, demand will remain artificially inflated during winter, theft will remain lucrative, and upstream explorers will remain starved of capital.

True stabilization demands dismantling the two monolithic gas utilities, SNGPL and SSGC, into smaller, accountable distribution companies where UFG losses cannot be hidden behind national averages. It requires moving away from uniform national gas pricing toward market-clearing regional tariffs, and allowing private third-party traders to use pipeline infrastructure to import and sell LNG directly to willing industrial buyers without state intermediation.

Yet every step toward rational economics carries immediate political pain. Raising residential tariffs triggers street protests and inflation spikes; cutting off subsidized gas to protected sectors sparks fierce lobbying battles in Islamabad. Until policymakers stop treating natural gas as a political entitlement rather than a scarce commodity, the ships will keep backing up at the ports, the cylinder prices will keep climbing in the bazaars, and the debt meter will keep spinning out of control.

EG

Emma Garcia

As a veteran correspondent, Emma Garcia has reported from across the globe, bringing firsthand perspectives to international stories and local issues.